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ABSTRACT 
 The prevailing explanation today claims that security concerns motivate North 
Korea to develop nuclear weapons and that the motivation would decrease if the concerns 
diminish. Nevertheless, given that the international community since the 1990s has failed 
to prevent North Korea from securing nuclear weapons, questions arise as to whether it 
properly identified North Korea’s motivations and whether those motivations remained 
unchanged. In this respect, this thesis investigates the question: “Historically, to what 
extent have domestic political concerns been a driver for North Korea in deciding on its 
nuclear weapons program?” The thesis argues that domestic politics became the 
prevailing motivation for the program from 1994 to 2009. The security perspective 
explains that Kim Jong-il, who monopolized power, behaved on behalf of national 
interests, and that the growing South Korean military capabilities and U.S. hardline 
policy motivated him to develop nuclear weapons. Yet, many of Kim Jong-il’s actions in 
this period did not coincide with national security preservation. In this regard, the 
domestic political perspective explains that his domestic political interests motivated him 
to develop nuclear weapons and that he used the program as a source of money and 
useful pretext for legitimizing his regime. Especially, North Korea’s response to the U.S. 
sanctions on the Banco Delta Asia shows that Kim Jong-il’s domestic political interests 
were the prevailing driver for the program. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will investigate the question: “Historically, to what extent have domestic 
political concerns been a driver for North Korea in deciding on its nuclear weapons 
program?” Many researchers have studied a state’s motivations for developing nuclear 
weapons, and they agree that concerns for security and domestic politics are two major 
motivations.1 Along with other scholars, Scott Sagan presents three models—security, 
domestic politics, and norms—as the three major categories to explain a state’s motivations 
to build nuclear weapons. Based on Sagan’s classifications, this thesis investigates a 
conventional premise that North Korea’s concerns for its security have been the most 
important driver for developing nuclear weapons.2  
To be specific, this thesis tests a hypothesis that the conventional premise is 
applicable before the 1990s, but that, due to the collapse of communist countries, the death 
of Kim Il-sung, and natural disasters, for the ensuing two decades North Korea needed to 
strengthen its internal solidarity more so than to concentrate on its security against foreign 
threats. In other words, this thesis aims to determine more precisely to what extent North 
Korea’s most important motivation for developing nuclear weapons changed from security 
                                                 
1 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 49; Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss, eds., The Nuclear 
Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2004), 20; Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 55, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539273. 
2 Bradley A. Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Regime,” Security Studies 4, no. 3 (1995): 496, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419509347592; 
Christopher W. Hughes, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” Asia Policy 3, no. 1 (2007): 82, https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2007.0000; 
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal 
Situation, CRS Report No. R41259 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 10, https:// 
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41259/43; Selig S. Harrison, “The Missiles of North Korea: How 
Real a Threat?,” World Policy Journal 17, no. 3 (2000): 23, https://doi.org/10.1215/07402775-2000-4001; 
Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 85, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539273; Siegfried S. Hecker, “Lessons 
Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises,” Daedalus 139, no. 1 (2010): 48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ 
daed.2010.139.1.44; Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, “The Debate over North Korea,” Political Science 
Quarterly 119, no. 2 (2004): 232, https://doi.org/10.2307/20202344. 
2 
concerns to domestic politics in the period of the Agreed Framework and the Six Party 
Talks—1994 to 2009. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The fact that the international community consequently failed to prevent North 
Korea from developing nuclear weapons raises some questions. Because the prevailing 
explanation in the 1990s claimed that North Korea’s security concerns motivated it to 
develop nuclear weapons, many researchers thought that North Korea’s motivation would 
decrease if its security concerns diminished.3 As a result, at the time of the Six Party Talks, 
the most basic task of the talks was to guarantee the security of North Korea.4 Nevertheless, 
given that the international community subsequently failed to prevent North Korea from 
securing nuclear weapons, questions arise as to whether the international community 
properly identified North Korea’s motivations for developing nuclear weapons and 
whether those motivations remained unchanged over time.  
Thus, this thesis also aims to provide a broader understanding of how concerns for 
domestic politics influenced North Korea’s decision making on its nuclear weapons 
program from 1994 to 2009. The thesis analyzes North Korea’s motives for developing 
                                                 
3 Gu Guoliang, “Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 
2 (2003): 141, https://doi.org/10.1162/01636600360569748; Hazel Smith, North Korea: Markets and 
Military Rule (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 311; James T. Laney and Jason T. 
Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (2003): 19, https://doi.org/10.2307/ 
20033501; Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers - Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 254; Selig S. Harrison, “The Missiles of North Korea,” World Policy Journal 17, 
no. 3 (2000): 23. At the end of the Six Party Talks, however, interest in the security guarantee declined as 
there was no progress on denuclearization of North Korea despite efforts made so far. See Andrei Lankov, 
“Staying Alive: Why North Korea Will Not Change,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008): 15, https://www. 
jstor.org/stable/ 20032577; Victor D. Cha, “What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea 
Conundrum.” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 120. https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600903 
224837. 
4 Christopher R. Hill, “U.S. Opening Statement at the Fourth Round of Six Party Talks,” U.S. 
Department of State, last modified July 26, 2005, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/50510.htm; 
“Six-Point Consensus Reached at Six Party Talks: Chinese Vice FM,” Permanent Mission of the People’s 
Republic of China to the UN, Aug 29, 2003, http://www.chinaun.org/eng/hyyfy/t29001.htm. At the time of 
the Agreed Framework, North Korea explained that its nuclear program was aimed at compensating for 
energy scarcity. Accordingly, the focus of the Agreed Framework was to disable North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons development capabilities by providing proliferation-resistant light water reactors and energy aid 
as North Korea did not recognize its development of nuclear weapons. See Don Oberdorfer, The Two 
Koreas: A Contemporary History, New ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 327–328. 
3 
nuclear weapons, targeting the period from the Agreed Framework to the Six Party Talks, 
based on North Korean domestic political changes. This period was important in terms of 
domestic politics in that Kim Il-sung’s dictatorship, which had continued for at least 44 
years, ended, and Kim Jong-il succeeded him and maintained the regime. Also, in this 
period, North Korea advanced its nuclear program by extracting plutonium from spent fuel, 
pursuing uranium enrichment, expanding its missile program, withdrawing from the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and conducting two nuclear tests.5 In this regard, 
this thesis attempts to help us understand how domestic political motives played a role in 
North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons at the time, by examining correlations 
between the domestic political environment and the advance of its nuclear program. In so 
doing, this thesis will improve scholars’ analytic capacity to evaluate the roles of different 
motivations in current and future North Korean behavior as well, thereby also providing a 
stronger foundation for policymaking. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review presents insight into areas of prior research relevant to this 
thesis. First, it discusses the current understanding of the motivations for a state to acquire 
nuclear weapons. Then, it examines interpretations of North Korean nuclear motivations. 
Lastly, it analyzes the characteristics of North Korean domestic politics during the target 
period of this study. 
1. Motivations for Proliferation 
Research on a state’s motivations for developing nuclear weapons commonly 
explains that concerns related to security and domestic politics are two important 
categories. First of all, there is a certain degree of consensus among researchers that 
security concerns are the most important factor influencing a state to develop nuclear 
weapons. Kurt Campbell suggests five major motivations for a state to develop nuclear 
weapons, and two of those five are related to security: “a change in the direction of U.S. 
                                                 
5 Hecker, “Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises,” 46–47. 
4 
foreign and security policy” in particular and “the erosion of regional or global security.”6 
Also, Campbell argues that “the question of the future direction of U.S. foreign and security 
policy” is an important motivator for a state to acquire nuclear weapons.7 
In addition, various theorists describe how, based on the international relations 
theory of neorealism, concerns for security serve as the most significant driver for a state 
to develop nuclear weapons. For example, Stephen Walt observes that from the perspective 
of neorealism, in the anarchic international system where there is no “central authority to 
protect states from one another,” states seek to survive. 8  Based on this idea, Joseph 
Cirincione discusses how, in this view, concern for security “remains the leading 
explanation for nuclear proliferation.”9 Cirincione explains that in this view, each state 
seeks to develop nuclear weapons to survive in “the Hobbesian jungle” because nuclear 
weapons can guarantee absolute security.10 Scott D. Sagan observes how concerns for 
security can explain the largest number of proliferation cases. 11 He explains that the 
enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons can encourage a state to develop nuclear 
weapons as a means of deterrence to ensure its own sovereignty and security.12 
Next, there is a consensus among these researchers that domestic politics is another 
major driver for developing nuclear weapons. Kurt Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and 
Mitchell Reiss demonstrate that nuclear weapons development can be determined by 
“domestic imperatives” such as domestic political upheaval or bureaucratic politics.13 To 
be specific, this work explains that declining states may select cost-effective options, 
including nuclear weapons, to prevent social unrest arising from economic and security 
                                                 
6 Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point, 20–28. 
7 Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, 20. 
8 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 
(1998): 31, https://doi.org/10.2307/1149275. 
9 Cirincione, Bomb Scare, 51. 
10 Cirincione, 51. 
11 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,” 85. 
12 Sagan, 57. 
13 Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point, 27–28. 
5 
grievances.14 Cirincione also sees how bureaucratic actors may play roles in the policy-
making process. 15  In other words, he explains that in a policy-making process of 
developing nuclear weapons, scientists, soldiers, and political leaders pursue their personal 
or organizational interests, and ultimately, these private interests affect a decision to 
develop nuclear weapons.16 Finally, Sagan demonstrates that a state’s decision on nuclear 
weapons development can also be influenced by political interests or parochial culture of 
particular groups rather than based on their national interests.17 
Also, these researchers agree that motivations—including concerns related to 
security and domestic politics—work together in various ways according to unique internal 
and external circumstances that each proliferator encounters in the process of developing 
nuclear weapons. Campbell explains that, under several circumstances, diverse motivations 
are accumulated in various forms and reinforce each other, and the results affect the 
decision making of nuclear weapons development. 18 Cirincione also discusses mixed 
motivations and explains that it is difficult to clearly distinguish how various motivations 
work together in deciding to develop nuclear weapons under various circumstances.19 
Sagan, in particular, describes this mix of motivations in the process of developing nuclear 
weapons as “multicausality.”20 He demonstrates that “[n]uclear weapons proliferation and 
nuclear restraint have occurred in the past and can occur in the future, for more than one 
reason.”21 Also, Sagan explains that the interpretations of motivations for nuclear weapons 
development may vary depending on historical situations.22 
                                                 
14 Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, 27. 
15 Cirincione, Bomb Scare, 63. 
16 Cirincione, 63–66. 
17 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,” 63–64. 
18 Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point, 20. 
19 Cirincione, Bomb Scare, 82. 
20 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,” 85. 
21 Sagan, 85. 
22 Sagan, 85. 
6 
2. North Korea’s Motivations  
Although many researchers have treated North Korea’s security concerns about 
foreign threats as the critical driver for its nuclear program from 1994 to 2009, it is 
questionable how appropriate this explanation is. Research that analyzes North Korea’s 
motivations for developing nuclear weapons from the security perspective explains that 
security has consistently been the major concern for North Korea. Victor Cha asserts that 
“North Korea undertakes limited but serious crisis-inducing acts of violence with the hope 
of leveraging crises more to its advantage,” and its intention remains unchanged.23 In 
addition, Siegfried Hecker argues that “[s]ecurity concerns have been the central driver of 
the North Korean ruling regime since the birth of the nation after World War II,” and its 
motivation for developing nuclear weapons can also be understood by examining its 
security environment.24 Selig Harrison also explains that no one could expect North Korea 
to give up its nuclear weapons and missiles without addressing North Korea’s security 
concerns,25 and Bradley Thayer claims that South Korea’s growth of conventional military 
power caused North Korea to develop nuclear weapons.26 
A few researchers have tried to explain North Korea’s motivations for developing 
nuclear weapons from a different point of view.27 For example, Glenn Chafetz, Hillel 
Abramson, and Suzette Grillot suggest a normative cause, such as that country’s aim to 
                                                 
23 Cha and Kang, “The Debate over North Korea,” 232. 
24 Hecker, “Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises,” 48. 
25 Harrison, “The Missiles of North Korea,” 23. 
26 Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Regime,” 496. 
27 There have been studies that explain the motives behind nuclear proliferation that involve factors 
other than security. For example, Peter Lavoy describes motivations for developing nuclear weapons as 
“the strategic beliefs and political activities of highly motivated and resourceful individuals.” See Peter R. 
Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies 2, no. 3–4 (1993): 192, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419309347524. Also, Solingen argues that domestic politics, such as 
domestic receptivity to external persuasion, is an important factor.  See Etel Solingen, “The Political 
Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 145, https://doi.org/10.2307/ 
2539198. Separate research is needed, however, because domestic politics and personality of leadership can 
be fundamentally different from one state to another. In this regard, this thesis examines only research that 
contains explanations on North Korea’s motivation for nuclear weapons development. 
7 
represent “a rebel against Western imperialism.” 28  Jacques Hymans also focuses on 
leadership and argues that North Korea’s “nuclear intentions are a product of its 
leadership’s oppositional nationalist identity conception.” 29  On the other hand, Etel 
Solingen argues that domestic politics, such as domestic receptivity to external persuasion, 
is an important factor.30 David Kang also tries to understand North Korea’s intention for 
developing nuclear weapons through the theory of political economy.31 
Some recent studies suggest looking at Kim Jong-il’s personal interests when 
conducting research on domestic political drivers for North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
development from 1994 to 2009. Sagan explains that a domestic political motive for 
developing nuclear weapons is to employ them “as political tools … to advance parochial 
domestic and bureaucratic interests.”32 In this point of view, a recent study points out that 
under a personalist dictatorship, “where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a 
single individual”33 as is the case in North Korea, this range of interests can be narrowed 
down to individuals. Under this personalist dictatorship, a leader has “such dominant 
personal power that other state institutions—parties, politburos, or military officers—
cannot overrule the decisions made at the top.”34 These studies suggest that research on 
North Korea’s domestic political motives for developing nuclear weapons needs to look at 
Kim Jong-il’s personal interests. 
                                                 
28 Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian 
and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Political Psychology 17, no. 4 
(1996): 748, https://doi.org/10.2307/3792136. 
29 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “Assessing North Korean Nuclear Intentions and Capacities: A New 
Approach,” Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (2008): 278-279, https://doi.org/10.1017/ 
S1598240800005324. 
30 Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” 145. 
31 Cha and Kang, “The Debate over North Korea,” 232. 
32 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,” 55. 
33 Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright, “The New Dictators,” Foreign Affairs, 
last modified September 26, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-26/new-dictators. 
34 Scott D. Sagan, “Armed and Dangerous,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 6 (2018): 35, https://www. 
foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-10-15/armed-and-dangerous. 
8 
As interpretations of North Korea’s motivations for developing nuclear weapons 
have largely leaned to security concerns,35 considerations on multicausality and internal 
situational context have been insufficient. The period from 1994 to 2009 is important in 
terms of North Korea’s domestic politics in that the long-held dictatorship of Kim Il-sung 
ended, and Kim Jong-il inherited and maintained power. Also, the collapse of socialism 
and repeated natural disasters fueled the deterioration of North Korean economic 
conditions. At the same time, in this period, North Korea’s nuclear program was advanced 
by extracting plutonium from spent fuel, pursuing uranium enrichment, expanding the 
country’s missile program, withdrawing from the NPT, and conducting two nuclear tests.36 
Based on this domestic turmoil and responses, one can speculate that the most important 
motivation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development at the time of the Agreed 
Framework and the Six Party Talks, from 1994 to 2009, somewhat changed from security 
concerns to domestic politics. 
Nevertheless, there has been only a small number of detailed studies on how 
security concerns and domestic politics of North Korea have simultaneously affected the 
development of nuclear weapons. Benjamin Habib and Liang Tuang Nah conducted 
research that considers both security concerns and domestic politics. Habib argues that 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program provides not only a security guarantee 37 but also 
the foundation for military-first (Songun) politics. Habib further explains that North 
Korea’s nuclear program gives an essential element for maintaining economic stability, the 
interests of the local bureaucracy, and ideological legitimacy.38 Also, relying on three 
international relations theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivismLiang Tuang 
                                                 
35 Cha and Kang, “The Debate over North Korea,” 232; Hecker, “Lessons Learned from the North 
Korean Nuclear Crises,” 48; Harrison, “The Missiles of North Korea,” 23; Hughes, “North Korea’s Nuclear 
Weapons,” 82; Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,” 85; Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear 
Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” 496. 
36 Hecker, “Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises,” 46-47. 
37 Benjamin Habib, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme and the Maintenance of the Songun 
System,” The Pacific Review 24, no. 1 (2011): 46, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.554992. 
38 Habib, 59–60. 
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Nah explains North Korea’s motivation for developing nuclear weapons.39 Specifically, 
according to the theory of liberalism, Nah interprets North Korea’s motivation to develop 
nuclear weapons between 1991 to 2007 as an attempt to obtain economic benefits from 
several negotiations.40 
To sum up, many researchers have explained North Korea’s motivations for 
developing nuclear weapons based on North Korea’s security concerns of seeking survival 
in the “Hobbesian Jungle.” Nevertheless, there is still much debate over major drivers of 
the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Therefore, this thesis can contribute to the 
debate by more accurately examining the extent to which North Korea’s motivations for 
developing nuclear weapons evolved from security concerns to domestic politics from 
1994 to 2009. 
3. North Korean Domestic Politics 
Despite predictions that North Korea would collapse due to its domestic instability, 
including the economic crisis and natural disasters following the death of Kim Il-sung in 
1994, Kim Jong-il successfully succeeded his father and maintained national stability. As 
the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Eastern bloc collapsed, the North Korean economic 
crisis grew more severe: in 1990, imports from the Soviet Union plunged to 10 percent of 
previous levels.41 In addition, according to a United Nations (UN) survey, the catastrophic 
floods in 1995 and 1996 caused more than 500,000 people to be displaced.42  
Above all, this period was a sensitive time for North Korea. Kim Il-sung, as a 
personalist dictator, had more power than any of the political parties.43 With his passing, 
                                                 
39 Liang Tuang Nah, “Explaining North Korean Nuclear Weapons Motivations: Constructivism, 
Liberalism, and Realism,” North Korean Review 9, no. 1 (2013): 61, https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.9.1.61. 
40 Nah, 67. 
41 Marcus Noland, “Famine and Reform in North Korea,” Asian Economic Papers 3, no. 2 (2004): 4–
5, https://doi.org/10.1162/1535351044193411. 
42 Noland, 6. 
43 Sagan, “Armed and Dangerous,” 35. 
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Kim Il-sung’s power, which had lasted approximately 44 years,44 was transferred to Kim 
Jong-il. Despite predictions at the time that North Korea would collapse under those 
domestic crises, however, Kim Jong-il successfully succeeded his father’s authority and 
maintained it.45 
Military-first politics emerged in this period as “the fundamental defining feature 
of North Korea,”46 and it is interpreted as a means of overcoming a crisis or consolidating 
power out of concern for the domestic political situation of North Korea at the time. 
According to a book published by the North Korean publishing bureau of foreign-language 
documents, the Foreign Language Publishing House (FLPH), military-first politics means 
giving “precedence to military affairs as the most important national affairs and the army 
as the main force of the revolution.”47 Some scholars describe military-first politics as a 
means of managing a domestic crisis. Daniel Pinkston and Hazel Smith, for example, argue 
that Kim Jong-il pursued the stability and survival of his regime by prioritizing resources 
to the military through military-first politics.48 Other scholars explain military-first politics 
based on the power balance between the Korean Workers Party (KWP) and the Korean 
People’s Army (KPA). Cha, Ken Gause, and Jongseok Woo claim that Kim Jong-il tried 
                                                 
44 How long Kim Il-sung had been in power is a subject of much controversy, but this thesis considers 
him to have been in power since the Korean War. 
45 Marcus Noland, “Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 4 (1997): 106, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/20048125; Scott Snyder, “North Korea’s Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal 
Problems and Implications for the Future,” Pacific Affairs: An International Review of Asia and the Pacific 
73, no. 4 (2000): 518, https://doi.org/10.2307/2672442; Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, “The Korea 
Crisis,” Foreign Policy, no. 136 (2003): 21, https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/ 
9564893.pdf. 
46 Victor D. Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York, NY: Ecco, 2012), 
92. 
47 Jong Chol Ri, Songun Politics in Korea (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Language Publishing House, 
2012), 1, http://www.bannedthought.net/Korea-DPRK/Ideology/SongunPoliticsInKorea-2012.pdf. 
48 Daniel A. Pinkston, “North Korea’s Foreign Policy Towards the United States,” Strategic Insight 5, 
no. 7 (2006): 2, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a521368.pdf; Smith, North Korea, 235. 
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to weaken the existing power of the KWP through military-first politics and consolidate 
his power based on the KPA.49 
Meanwhile, although North Korea’s domestic politics can be distinguished based 
on the range of people affecting decision making, there is a consensus that Kim Jong-il had 
the final decision-making authority. First, Joseph Bermudez and Soyoung Kwon explain 
that only Kim Jong-il exerted unlimited authority in the decision-making process of North 
Korean policies.50 Kong Dan Oh and Ralph Hassig expand the range of people who 
influence decision making a little bit more and argue that Kim Jong-il relied on “a kitchen 
cabinet composed of a small group of friends and family members of approximately his 
own age.”51 Finally, while Patrick McEachern and Terence Roehrig assert that Kim Jong-
il was the most important person in North Korean domestic politics, they also argue that 
policies are formed through a balance of power among the KWP, the KPA, and the 
government under Kim Jong-il’s authority.52 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis hypothesizes that the most important driver for North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons development process at the time of the Agreed Framework and the Six Party 
Talks, from 1994 to 2009, somewhat changed from security concerns to domestic politics. 
Although there was a huge change in the international security environment marked by the 
                                                 
49 Cha, The Impossible State, 91; Jongseok Woo, “Songun Politics and the Political Weakness of the 
Military in North Korea: An Institutional Account,” Problems of Post-Communism 63, no. 4 (2016): 260, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2016.1145065; Ken E. Gause, North Korean Civil-Military Trends: 
Military-First Politics to a Point (Strategic Studies Institute in Army War College, 2006), v–vi. 
50 Joseph Bermudez, “The Military and the Power-Holding Elite,” in North Korea Policy Elites, ed. 
Kongdan O. Hassig (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2004), I-29; Soyoung Kwon, “State 
Building in North Korea: From a ‘Self Reliant’ to a ‘Military-First’ State,” Asian Affairs 34, no. 3 (2003): 
294, https://doi.org/10.1080/0306837032000136314. 
51 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 97. 
52 Patrick McEachern, Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Post-Totalitarian Politics, Contemporary 
Asia in the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 215; Patrick McEachern, “North Korea’s 
Internal Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Origins of North Korea’s Juche: Colonialism, War, and 
Development, ed. Jae-Jung Suh (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 149–156; Terence Roehrig, “The 
Roles and Influence of the Military,” in North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society, ed. 
Kyung-Ae Park and Scott Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 54. 
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collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, this period is more important in terms of North 
Korea’s domestic politics. A dictator who does not have full control of his or her military 
in the process of power transfer encounters a coup,53 and, in a personalist dictatorship like 
North Korea, upon the successful consolidation of power, Kim Jong-il’s personal interests 
could have become the most important criterion of decision making. Thus, solving 
domestic turmoil could have been the most important driver for Kim Jong-il in making 
decisions for North Korea’s policies. From this point of view, especially with regard to this 
period, the largest part of North Korea’s motivation for developing nuclear weapons could 
have belonged to domestic politics. 
This thesis tests the hypothesis that the prevailing driver for nuclear weapons 
development of North Korea changed from security concerns to domestic politics by 
examining how military-first politics related to that country’s development of nuclear 
weapons. Military-first politics that emerged after Kim Jong-il took power is the most 
noticeable change in the policy of his regime.54 Therefore, if the major motivation for 
developing nuclear weapons changed from security concerns to domestic politics, the 
related changes of Kim Jong-il’s perception or response would have been made in the same 
context when it dealt with military-first politics. From this point of view, this thesis 
examines how military-first politics related to nuclear weapons development of North 
Korea, and what the intentions, if any, of this development were. Through this process, the 
thesis tests the hypothesis that the major motivation for North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
development changed somewhat from security concerns to domestic politics. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Documentary surveys were conducted to find a relationship between North Korea’s 
motivation for developing nuclear weapons and domestic politics. First, the thesis looks 
into existing studies on North Korea’s motives for developing nuclear weapons from 1994 
to 2007. By doing so, it examines on what evidence these studies are based in determining 
                                                 
53 Milan W. Svolik, “Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes,” American 
Journal of Political Science 53, no. 2 (2009): 478, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00382.x. 
54 Cha, The Impossible State, 92. 
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North Korea’s motives for developing nuclear weapons. The thesis then looks into studies 
on North Korea’s domestic political characteristics, and by doing so it examines what its 
domestic political interests meant to Kim Jong-il at the time. Finally, the thesis examines 
existing studies on the relationship between North Korea’s nuclear weapons development 
and domestic politics to analyze which arguments are persuasive or unconvincing. Through 
this process, this thesis provides a persuasive explanation of how North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons development was related to Kim Jong-il’s domestic political interests at the time. 
During this process, this thesis applies a modified version of Graham Allison’s 
decision-making models, which reduces three categories into two. Allison devised three 
models—the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Process Model (OPM), and 
the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM)—to explain the behavior of the U.S. government 
during the Cuban missile crisis. The RAM defines a government as a rational and unitary 
actor, who has “one set of specified goals,” which are national interests.55 On the other 
hand, the OPM and the BPM see a government as “no unitary actor but many actors as 
players,”56 whose domestic political interests are distinct from national interests.57 To be 
specific, under the OPM, the goal is to abide by “constraints defining acceptable 
performance,” and under the BPM, goals include “national, organizational, and personal 
interests.”58 Based on Allison’s models, this thesis explains the security perspective on the 
North Korean nuclear weapons program by applying the RAM, and describes the domestic 
political perspective on the program by applying other models, including the OPM and the 
BPM.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis consists of four chapters. In this first chapter, the thesis has examined 
accumulated knowledge about North Korean motivations for developing nuclear weapons. 
                                                 
55 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Longman, 1999), 23-27. 
56 Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The American Political 
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Next, in the second chapter, the thesis investigates the North Korean nuclear program from 
the security perspective. In the third chapter, the thesis questions the interpretation of the 
security perspective and suggests an alternative explanation based on the domestic political 
perspective. Finally, the last chapter summarizes major conclusions, discusses how they 
contribute to broader knowledge, summarizes any policy implications, and identifies 
opportunities for future research. 
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II. THE SECURITY PERSPECTIVE 
As Chapter I discussed, scholars have mainly interpreted North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program from the security perspective. Many scholars have regarded the nuclear 
weapons program as a result of its security concerns, based on the assumption that North 
Korea is a rational and unitary actor seeking survival in the anarchic international system. 
In this regard, North Korea fits well into the RAM, which assumes a unified national actor 
who has a coherent utility function of value-maximizing, 59  in that Kim Jong-il 
monopolized power under the supreme leader system, enabling the direct translation of 
security concerns into policies. Thus, this chapter examines the assumption that the nuclear 
weapons program could be a result of Kim Jong-il’s security concerns and that the same 
priority of interests could have played a relatively consistent role in the case of military-
first politics (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Explanation from the Security Perspective 




North Korea fits into the RAM, which assumes a unified national actor 
who has a coherent utility function of value-maximizing. 
Survival is the most important value of a state. Also, Kim Jong-il could 
act on behalf of North Korea’s national interests, and, in this regard, 





Military-first politics and the development of nuclear weapons were 
results of a relatively coherent utility function, which values survival. 
Military-first politics: 
to concentrate scarce 
resources to the 
military sector. 
The nuclear weapons development: 
to have a deterrence capability 
against the South Korean 
conventional military forces and 
U.S. hardline policy. 
                                                 
59 Allison defines “value-maximizing” behavior as “the likelihood of any particular action results 
from a combination of the nation’s (1) relevant values and objectives, (2) perceived alternative courses of 
action, (3) esti-mates of various sets of consequences (which will follow from each alternative), and (4) net 
valuation of each set of consequences.” See Allison, Essence of Decision, 23–27; Hazel Smith, “Bad, Mad, 
Sad or Rational Actor? Why the ‘Securitization’ Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North 
Korea,” International Affairs 76, no. 3 (2000): 614–616, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00154. 
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A. TWO MAJOR POLICIES OF THE KIM JONG-IL ERA 
Scholars have regarded military-first politics and the continuation of nuclear 
weapons development as two major policies of the Kim Jong-il era. Military-first politics 
was the most evident change in North Korean policy during the Kim Jong-il era.60 North 
Korea has claimed that military-first politics is a creative way of protecting the nation from 
imperialist forces and building socialism by giving top priority to military affairs. Under 
the banner of military-first politics, Kim Jong-il strengthened the authority of the National 
Defense Commission (NDC); he elevated the status of the military; he enlarged the roles 
of the military in the economic area; he strengthened control over the North Korean 
people’s movement and thinking. At the same time, Kim Jong-il sustained and in some 
ways accelerated the development of nuclear weapons. Given the North Korean economic 
crisis at the time and the cost for developing nuclear weapons, his decision to continue or 
accelerate the nuclear weapons program is the other major change in policy. 
1. The Advent of Military-First Politics 
The emergence of military-first politics is “the fundamental defining feature of 
North Korea” during the Kim Jong-il era.61 North Korean media have explained that 
military-first politics began in 1995, but the term “military-first politics” first appeared in 
December 1997.62 According to a North Korean official publication of the FLPH, military-
first politics is “a revolutionary mode of leadership and socialist mode of politics that gives 
top priority to military affairs, and defends the country, the revolution and socialism and 
dynamically pushes ahead with overall socialist construction by dint of the revolutionary 
mettle and combat capabilities of the People’s Army.” 63  According to the same 
publication, military-first politics comes from the view of the world that “the United States 
and other imperialist forces [have] resorted to every manner of vicious schemes to stifle 
                                                 
60 Cha, The Impossible State, 92. 
61 Cha, 92. 
62 Pinkston, “North Korea’s Foreign Policy Towards the United States,” 4. 
63 Ri, Songun Politics in Korea, 1. 
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[North] Korea.”64 Based on this standpoint, North Korea concludes that the only way to 
counter U.S. hardline policy is to build strong military forces.65 The North Korean leader’s 
New Year address, which is the guiding principle of the supreme leader, shows this 
perception well. To be specific, negative expressions about the United States, which 
disappeared after the late 1970s, began to be used by North Korean leaders again in the 
Kim Jong-il era.66 
Under the banner of military-first politics, there were some noticeable changes in 
the government’s policy, including the strengthened authority of the NDC and status of the 
KPA, an enlarged role of the KPA in the economic area, and strengthened government 
control of the movement and thoughts of the North Korean people. 
a. Strengthened Authority of the NDC and the Status of the KPA 
Military-first politics strengthened the NDC’s authority and the status of the KPA. 
Under the banner of military-first politics, through constitutional revisions on September 
5, 1998, North Korea abolished the premier (Jusuk) system and transferred most of its 
political, military, and economic authorities to the NDC.67 The fact that members of the 
NDC began to overtake Politburo and Secretariat members in social position reveals the 
strengthened authority of the NDC. For example, in 1995, Cho Myong Nok, the first vice-
chairman of the NDC, was ranked in 95th on the list of national rituals, which shows a 
person’s social position in the government, but he was ranked third on the list in 2001.68 
In addition, a high ratio of Kim Jong-il visitation to military units and a change in 
the composition of the entourage that accompanied Kim Jong-il on his on-the-spot 
                                                 
64 Ri, 23. 
65 Ri, 25. 
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dbpia.co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE06388044. 
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guidance created an atmosphere that values the military. Because Kim Jong-il was reluctant 
to have meetings and preferred to manage state affairs behind the scenes, the role of the 
former centers of power, such as the Politburo, deteriorated, but the political position of 
the entourage accompanying him on his on-the-spot guidance was raised further.69 In this 
respect, the frequency of on-the-spot guidance to the military units grew after Kim Jong-il 
took power, and the proportion of military officers in his entourage gradually increased 
and became the largest in 2003.70 These trends demonstrate the strengthened influence of 
the KPA. 
b. Enlarged Role of the Military in the North Korean Economy 
Military-first politics enlarged the role of the military in the economic area. The 
KPA controlled major trading companies, which managed the domestic food distribution 
and supplied uniforms and weapons for the military. 71  Accordingly, the government 
deployed military personnel to construction sites and established new military farms.72 For 
example, the military was deployed to large size construction projects, including Taecheon 
Power Plant, Gaecheon-Taeseongho Waterway, and Pyongyang-Hyangsan Tourism 
Road.73 Also, the military was deployed to cultivate land on behalf of farmers who lost 
their desire to work and to create military farms to take direct responsibility for farming.74 
Some researchers estimate that the military economy accounted for up to 70 percent of the 
North Korean domestic defense industries. 75  In this process, the NDC controlled all 
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University Press, 2007), 54.  
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activities relating to the military economy and was in charge of the overall process from 
planning to exporting of military equipment and related technologies.76 
c. Strengthened Government Control of North Koreans’ Movement and 
Thoughts  
Military-first politics also tightened the government’s control of North Koreans’ 
movement and thoughts. To be specific, the NDC, the core organization of military-first 
politics, had gradually changed its character from a military organization to one that 
controls society as a whole. For example, the fact that personnel from the Ministry of 
People’s Security (MPS) and the State Security Department (SSD) were added to the NDC 
while the commanders of the Pyongyang Defense Command (PDC) and the People’s 
Armed Forces (PAF) were excluded after 1998 indirectly indicates that military-first 
politics aimed to strengthen functions for social control.77 In this context, the North Korean 
government dispatched troops to farms and stations to monitor its people and tried to 
control their lives through the MPS and the SSD.78 
2. Continued North Korean Nuclear Weapons Development 
While implementing military-first politics, North Korea simultaneously continued 
to develop nuclear weapons. Given the enormous investment required for developing 
nuclear weapons in comparison with the North Korean gross domestic product (GDP) and 
the country’s severe economic crisis, Kim Jong-il’s decision to continue and in ways 
accelerate nuclear weapons development represents the other major policy.  
In late 1994, when Kim Jong-il took power, the North Korean economy was at its 
worst due to reduced aid caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and famine that 
followed several natural disasters.79 Accordingly, considering the economic crisis at the 
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time and the huge investment required for developing nuclear weapons, Kim Jong-il would 
have had to make a decision on suspension, continuation, or acceleration of nuclear 
weapons development after he took power.80 In this respect, it is significant that he decided 
to invest a relatively sizeable amount of money into North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program under the economic crisis. In other words, considering the cost for developing a 
nuclear warhead, which was equal to about 2.57 to 6.76 percent of its GDP at the time of 
North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006,81 continuing to develop nuclear weapons in spite 
of the economic crisis was a major policy, which had a necessity and an importance 
commensurate with the cost. 
Meanwhile, the North Korean nuclear weapons program is an integration of its 
nuclear and missile programs as missiles are the primary means of delivering nuclear 
warheads for North Korea.82 
a. Continued International Efforts to Deter North Korea’s Nuclear 
Program 
In the 1990s and 2000s, North Korea continued to develop its nuclear program in 
terms of technology, and the international community’s efforts such as the Agreed 
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Framework and the Six Party Talks also continued with the aim to deter North Korea’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons.  
The North Korean nuclear program began in the 1950s with Kim Il-sung’s efforts 
to develop nuclear technologies, and in 1986, North Korea started operating its five 
megawatt-electric reactor in Yongbyon, subsequently attempting to extract plutonium by 
building reprocessing facilities. 83 In 1992 and 1993, one of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency’s (IAEA) inspections found a discrepancy in the amount of reprocessed 
plutonium between the submitted data of North Korea and the IAEA’s estimated figure.84 
Accordingly, the IAEA requested special inspections on two sites, but North Korea rejected 
the request and announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT.85 Subsequently, the 
first nuclear crisis escalated in 1994 when North Korea began removing spent fuel rods 
from the Yongbyon reactor without the IAEA’s monitoring.86  
However, bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea to resolve the 
crisis began after former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s visit to North Korea in June 1994, 
and the Agreed Framework was signed in October of the same year.87 In the Agreed 
Framework signed on October 21, 1994, the United States and North Korea agreed that the 
latter would shut down the reactor in Yongbyon and allow the IAEA’s special 
inspections.88 In return, the United States promised to normalize political and diplomatic 
relations with North Korea, to construct proliferation-resistant light-water reactors through 
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) for replacing graphite-
moderated reactors, and to provide annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during the 
construction of those reactors.89 
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Under the Agreed Framework, the North Korean nuclear program appeared to be 
suspended, although suspicions were raised about the nuclear facilities at Kumchang-ni, 
which were found to be untrue in 1999.90 Nevertheless, implementation of the Agreed 
Framework was slow due to the proliferation of North Korean missiles and the Bush 
administration’s changes in U.S. policies toward North Korea.91 In this situation, the 
second nuclear crisis began in 2002 when the United States suspected North Korea of 
enriching uranium.92 The second nuclear crisis escalated in October 2002 after the visit of 
James Kelly, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, to North 
Korea and the announcement of suspicion about uranium enrichment. 93  The IAEA 
demanded that North Korea confirm its uranium enrichment program, but North Korea 
refused to do so and threatened to restart its reactor in Yongbyon and to withdraw from the 
NPT.94 
Accordingly, six rounds of Six Party Talks among the United States, South Korea, 
Russia, China, Japan, and North Korea to resolve the issue were held from 2003 to 2009. 
Especially, in the fourth round, North Korea committed to “abandoning all nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards” in return for ensuring 
North Korea’s right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and providing the light-water 
reactors.95 The atmosphere of the talks severely deteriorated, however, due to the U.S. 
State Department’s sanction on Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in 2005, which caused a freeze 
of $25 million dollars of North Korean funds, prompting North Korea to boycott the further 
Six Party Talks and to conduct its first underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006.96 
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After that, the Six Party Talks resumed with the lifting of the U.S. sanction on the BDA, 
and in 2007, the six parties agreed on the action plan’s initial steps to implement the joint 
statement in 2005.97 Yet, subsequent talks broke down in 2009 due to North Korea’s 
continued rocket launches and disagreements over verification, and the Six Party Talks 
have not yet restarted.98 
b. Continued Advancement of North Korea’s Missile Program 
In the 1990s and 2000s, North Korea continued to advance its missile programs, 
which is the other part of the nuclear weapons program. Advancement included test-firing 
of Taepo Dong-1/2 missiles and Unha-2 missiles, while efforts of the international 
community to stop the North Korean missile proliferation continued simultaneously.  
The South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) estimates that the North 
Korean missile program started after North Korea acquired some missile technologies from 
the Chinese missile development program in the early 1970s.99 Subsequently, North Korea 
made efforts to develop and deploy short- and medium-range missiles, including Scud-C 
and Nodong ballistic missiles, until the early 1990s.100 After Kim Jong-il took power, 
North Korea focused more on developing intermediate- and long-range missiles. In this 
process, in 1998 North Korea test-fired a Taepo Dong-1 intermediate-range missile with a 
range of 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers, and then Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director 
George Tenet testified that the missile could deliver small payloads to Alaska and Hawaii 
with some technological improvements. 101  Also, in 2006, North Korea test-fired its 
longest-range Taepo Dong-2 missile, although the United States assessed it failed.102 
Subsequently, North Korea test-fired an Unha-2 rocket, a modified version of the Taepo 
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Dong-2 long-range missile.103 Although the United States reported that the rocket’s bodies 
landed in the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean, North Korea announced its success in 
placing a satellite into the orbit.104 
At the same time, efforts of the international community to stop North Korean 
missile proliferation continued. First, in 1992, the United States began to place sanctions 
on some North Korean companies, which were related to the North Korean missile 
proliferation,105 and the UN, Japan, and Australia placed sanctions on North Korea after 
the test-firing of the Taepo Dong-2 long-range missile in 2006.106 Also, bilateral missile 
talks between the United States and North Korea to stop the latter’s missile proliferation 
continued. The United States and North Korea had their first bilateral missile talks in Berlin 
in 1996.107 In the talks, the United States demanded North Korea’s compliance with the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 108  and North Korea demanded 
compensation for financial losses caused by halting missile exports.109 In their fourth 
bilateral missile talks in Berlin in 1999, North Korea declared a moratorium on long-range 
missile tests in return for U.S. partial lifting of economic sanctions.110 The moratorium 
lasted for seven years until North Korea test-fired a Taepo Dong-2 long-range missile in 
2006.111 Aside from the moratorium on long-range missile tests, however, North Korea 
again demanded $1 billion per year in compensation for halting its missile exports during 
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the fifth round of missile talks in Kuala Lumpur.112 Accordingly, missile talks made little 
progress, and no further missile talks took place after the talks in 2000.113 
B. THE SUPREME LEADER SYSTEM: KIM JONG-IL AS AN 
EMBODIMENT OF A UNITARY NATIONAL ACTOR 
Kim Jong-il was the embodiment of a unitary national actor as he monopolized 
power in all aspects under the supreme leader (Suryong) system, and accordingly, he could 
act on behalf of North Korea’s national interests. From the security perspective, North 
Korea is one of the unitary actors in the anarchic international system. Especially for North 
Korea, Kim Jong-il was an embodiment of this unitary national actor in that he 
monopolized power based on the supreme leader system. This situation makes North Korea 
fit well into the RAM, which assumes a unified national actor who has a coherent utility 
function of value-maximizing.114 Therefore, as the embodiment of the unitary national 
actor of North Korea, Kim Jong-il could act on behalf of North Korea’s national interests. 
The supreme leader system, which emerged in the late 1960s, established its 
theoretical foundation in the late 1980s, and it gradually turned into a system where all 
power is concentrated on the supreme leader. The concept of the system emerged in the 
late 1960s during a conference of social scientists, and they defined the supreme leader as 
“the brain that exclusively leads the party, the regime, and labor organizations.” 115 
Subsequently, in the late 1980s, the system was established according to two of its most 
prominent theoretical foundations, “the theory of socio-political organism” and the “Juche 
outlook on the revolution.”116 According to the former theory, North Korea as a socio-
political organism comprises various entities that have their own roles, including “Suryong 
as the great leader of the revolution and social construction, the KWP as the general staff 
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of the revolution, the government as the transmission belt of the KWP and the masses, and 
the KPA as the KWP’s revolutionary force.”117 Then the theory divides a person’s life into 
physical life and socio-political life, and argues that the latter is more valuable because a 
socio-political life is eternal through a socio-political organism, unlike a person’s finite 
physical life.118 Accordingly, the theory justifies that serving the supreme leader is the 
fundamental requirement, joy, and glory for the KWP, the government, and the masses as 
a part of the socio-political organism, North Korea.119 In addition to this, the Juche outlook 
on the revolution demands the people’s devotion to following the supreme leader’s 
revolutionary ideas and leadership unconditionally and thoroughly.120 
As Kim Jong-il gradually gave himself omnipotent authority, he became the main 
agent of policy decisions in North Korea.121 During the Kim Il-sung era, the decision-
making process comprised not only top-down instruction but also bottom-up components, 
and the process was clearly defined. The process usually included a proposal by a 
department, a review and submission by the Party guidance committee, an approval by the 
Party Secretariat chaired by the General Secretary, and a return for implementation.122 By 
contrast, Kim Jong-il replaced the former decision-making process with so-called crony 
politics and report politics. Major policies were increasingly processed privately through 
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gatherings of close aide at Kim Jong-il’s residences. Also, in all circumstances, including 
the aide gatherings and on-the-spot guidance, the KWP Organization Guidance 
Department recorded Kim Jong-il’s instructions and transmitted them to related 
departments.123 Then, related departments executed sufficient consultations and submitted 
a report of policy draft addressing the instructions to Kim Jong-il.124 
Considering these facts, the decision-making process of North Korea fits well into 
the RAM, which assumes a unified national actor who has a coherent utility function of 
value-maximizing.125 Designed for analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis case, the RAM 
defines a nation or government as a rational and unitary actor. This actor has “one set of 
specified goals (the equivalent of a consistent utility function), one set of perceived options, 
and a single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative.” 126 
Accordingly, under this circumstance, a rational agent “selects the alternative whose 
consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives.”127 The North Korean 
decision-making process fits well into this model in that Kim Jong-il monopolized power 
as leader, making a choice to maximize his value, which can be related to North Korea’s 
national interests. Based on this theory, the two major policies of the Kim Jong-il era—
military-first politics and the development of nuclear weapons—can be understood as 
results of Kim Jong-il’s relatively coherent utility function of maximizing North Korea’s 
national interests. 
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C. MOTIVATIONS FOR THE POLICIES RELATED TO THE SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT 
The end of the Cold War raised a question about the legitimacy of the socialist 
system and caused problems in terms of security for North Korea. In this context, words 
and writings of a unitary actor of North Korea, Kim Jong-il, can be indicative of his 
thinking relating to changes in the security environment before and after the collapse of 
socialism. In this regard, one can assume that his concerns could be reflected in North 
Korean policies. To be specific, through military-first politics, North Korea could 
concentrate its scarce resources to the military sector. On the other hand, through the 
development of nuclear weapons, North Korea could have a deterrence capability against 
the growing South Korean conventional military capabilities and the Bush administration’s 
hardline policy of defining North Korea as part of an axis of evil (see Table 2). 
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1. Changes in the Security Environment 
As noted previously, the end of the Cold War raised a question about the legitimacy 
of the socialist system and caused problems in terms of security.128 First of all, the collapse 
of the communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was an indirect 
example of the future of the North Korean regime. In the late 1980s, anti-socialist waves 
began to rise in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. After the emergence of the non-
communist government in Poland in 1989, Communist dictatorship ended in Hungary, 
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Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.129 Subsequently, the maverick Romanian communist 
leader Nicolae Ceausescu, who had a special relationship with Kim Il-sung, was 
overthrown and executed by the Romanian people, and East German leader Erich 
Honecker, another special European friend, was deposed as well. 130 A North Korean 
defector Hwang Jang-yop, the founder of the North Korean Juche ideology, recalls in his 
memoirs that the unification of East and West Germany shook North Korean policymakers 
who were in a similar situation.131 Particularly, on November 6, 1991, the Soviet Union, 
which was the center of the socialist system, was dissolved and dispersed into 15 sovereign 
states.132 As such, the collapse of the communist countries in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union sparked intense speculation that Kim’s family and its regime would be the 
next.133 
Also, for North Korea, finding substitutes for its military products, which had been 
mostly provided by the Soviet Union, was a hard challenge.134 Under this circumstance, 
the rapid growth of the South Korean conventional military capabilities made the situation 
even worse. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the process of attracting massive 
investment from South Korea, Russia declared that it would reduce its military aid to North 
Korea and support the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.135 This situation forced 
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North Korea to protect itself without support from alliances. 136  The North Korean 
reorganization, redeployment, and reinforcement in its military sector, beginning from 
1990, came in this context. 137  In addition, South Korea’s rapid development in its 
conventional military forces had worsened the imbalance between the two Koreas.138 To 
be specific, while North Korea’s conventional forces continued to field T-72 tanks and 
Mig-29 fighters, which represented technologies from before the 1990s, South Korea’s 
forces, through continuous investment to its military sector, had developed dominant tanks 
and imported advanced fighter jets from the United States.139 
Furthermore, South Korea’s efforts to normalize diplomatic relations with the 
communist countries, which was part of South Korean northern politics (Nordpolitk), 
added to a sense of crisis for North Korea. Roh Tae-woo, the 13th president of South Korea, 
sought to isolate North Korea by normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea’s 
allies, including the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern European communist countries.140 
At that time, Gorbachev of the Soviet Union also wanted to gain economic benefits by 
normalizing relations with South Korea, based on the national interests of Russia in the 
economic area rather than socialist ideology. To be specific, South Korea promised the 
Soviet Union assistance for opening markets, investment in the Siberian region, and 
providing $3 billion worth of loans for purchasing South Korean goods.141 Gorbachev’s 
interest in opening markets of the Soviet Union featured in his UN speech—“[t]oday, the 
preservation of any kind of ‘closed’ society is hardly possible”—must have chilled North 
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Korean policymakers. 142  In relation to China, South Korean northern politics was 
consistent with Deng Xiaoping’s national strategy in pursuit of market-oriented reforms, 
and in this context, the establishment of diplomatic ties with China was made in 1992.143 
Also, after Western-oriented officials took over government, those Eastern European 
countries’ relations with South Korea normalized on the condition of receiving loans from 
South Korea.144 As such, the northern politics of South Korea isolated and excluded North 
Korea from supporters in the international community, and accordingly, it added a sense 
of crisis to North Korea.145 
2. North Korean Perception of the Security Environment 
These changes in the security environment raised North Korea’s security concerns, 
and Kim Jong-il’s words and writing can be indicative of these concerns. From the 
viewpoint that Kim Jong-il was a unitary actor of North Korea who has a coherent utility 
function of value, it is necessary to examine Kim Jong-il’s perception of the environment 
in order to look at his structure of values and the motives for his policy decisions. Yet, it is 
not easy to grasp his personal perception of the surroundings as his words and writings may 
conflict with his actual intentions, and as he might deliberately avoid mentioning some 
topics. Nevertheless, his words and writings, which repeatedly treat certain subjects, can 
be indicative of his thinking. In this regard, the security perspective assumes that the most 
important value for a state is survival, and Kim Jong-il’s words and writings reveal his 
interests relating to the survival of North Korea. 
In terms of security concerns, Kim Jong-il’s words and writings in the 1990s reflect 
his concerns about changes in the security environment before and after the collapse of 
socialism. During the period of the collapse of socialism, he understood international 
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relations as a “sharp confrontation” between socialism and imperialism.146 For example, 
in 1990, he described that “[t]oday, owing to the vicious anti-socialist moves of the 
imperialists, a sharp confrontation is going on between socialism and imperialism in the 
international area.”147 Also, he explained that “[r]ecently the imperialists are getting more 
and more frantic in their attempt to frustrate socialism.”148 Especially, his talk with the 
senior officials of the central committee of the KWP in 1992 revealed his potential 
concerns over the collapse of socialism: 
Over the recent years the imperialists and reactionaries have been resorting 
to every scheme possible to stifle our country, … we must approach the 
present situation on an optimistic point of view and staunchly defend the 
cause of socialism.149 
Subsequently, after the end of the Cold War, he described that the United States 
implements a policy of power disguised as peace. For example, he explained that the 
United States “is invariably resorting to the policy of power, threatening us with ceaseless 
military exercises and aggressive maneuvers and instigating the south Korean rulers to war 
provocation hullabaloo.”150 Therefore, this evidence shows that Kim Jong-il had one set 
of specified goals, which prioritized survival. 
3. Major Motivations for North Korean Policies 
The evidence shows Kim Jong-il’s perception of the environment, his major 
motivation for the policies, can partly be explained by the security perspective. Under the 
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security crises during the period, through military-first politics, he could concentrate scarce 
resources on the military sector. Also, through the development of nuclear weapons, he 
could have a deterrence capability against the growing South Korean conventional military 
capabilities and the Bush administration’s hardline policy of defining North Korea as part 
of an axis of evil. 
a. Military-First Politics 
Based on the security perspective, North Korea needed to concentrate its scarce 
resources on the military sector through military-first politics. The dissolution of military 
alliances after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the growing capabilities of the South 
Korean conventional military forces came as security crises for North Korea.151 Russia 
declared its intention to reduce military aid to North Korea in an effort to attract South 
Korean commercial investment,152 and South Korea, based on U.S. support, came to 
possess dominant tanks and aircraft in comparison with those of North Korea.153 Also, 
without the support of the Soviet Union, the North Korean government could not sustain 
its military supplies. For example, according to the official figures on the North Korean 
composition of output published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), total output in 
1996 was roughly halved in comparison with that in 1992.154 Kim Jong-il’s remark, “there 
were people who saw the harsh reality and were concerned about whether socialism could 
be built to the end,” shows that high-ranking officials of the party and the military were in 
great turmoil.155 Thus, in response to the security crises, through military-first politics, 
Kim Jong-il could concentrate North Korea’s scarce resources on the military sector. 
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b. Nuclear Weapons Development 
Also, based on the security perspective, North Korea needed a deterrence capability 
against the South Korea’s growing conventional military capabilities and the Bush 
administration’s hardline policy of defining North Korea as part of an axis of evil. During 
the Kim Jong-il era, when there was rapid development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program, security threats were on the rise for that country. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
at the time, when South Korean conventional forces were being augmented based on an 
alliance with the United States, made North Korea lose the upper hand in its conventional 
forces.156 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the process of attracting massive 
investment from South Korea, Russia declared that it would reduce its military aid to North 
Korea.157 In addition, South Korea’s rapid qualitative development in military forces had 
worsened the imbalance between the two Koreas. 158   North Korea’s reorganization, 
redeployment, and reinforcement in its military sector, beginning from 1990, came in this 
context.159 
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The Bush administration, unlike the former Clinton administration, maintained a 
hardline policy toward North Korea. This stance is revealed in President Bush’s mention 
during a meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung at the White House that he 
“look[s] forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, 
but that any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential 
agreement.”160 Also, in the President’s 2002 State of the Union speech, he announced that 
North Korea is a part of “the axis of evil,” and subsequently his Secretary of State nominee 
Condoleezza Rice referred to countries like North Korea as “outposts of tyranny.”161 In 
this context, the invasion of Iraq a year later showed that North Korea could also be invaded 
by the United States in the near future.162 North Korea’s fear was apparent in an invitation 
to U.S. nuclear experts in 2004, which was North Korea’s effort to convince the 
international community that it has a deterrent capability by allowing them to see its 
nuclear facilities.163 Therefore, by developing nuclear weapons, North Korea could have 
a deterrence capability against the South Korean conventional military forces and the Bush 
administration’s hardline policy of defining North Korea as part of an axis of evil.164 
D. CONCLUSION 
Based on the RAM, this chapter has demonstrated that the two major policies of 
North Korea—military-first politics and the development of nuclear weapons—were, to a 
large degree, the result of Kim Jong-il’s security concerns. Kim Jong-il behaved as a 
unified national actor as he monopolized power under the supreme leader system, and this 
makes North Korea fit well into the RAM, which assumes a unified national actor who has 
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a coherent utility function of value-maximizing.165 In this regard, Kim Jong-il’s words and 
writings support the interpretation that he could act on behalf of North Korea’s national 
interests, which prioritized survival, and that this prioritization of interests affected his 
policy decision-making with relative consistency. Therefore, based on this idea and the 
North Korean security crises at the time, the most influential motivation for those two 
major policies could be partly explained by Kim Jong-il’s own security concerns. Under 
the security crises, Kim Jong-il needed to concentrate North Korea’s scarce resources on 
the military sector through military-first politics. Also, he needed to have a nuclear 
deterrence capability against the South Korean conventional military forces and the Bush 
administration’s hardline policy of defining North Korea as part of an axis of evil. 
Although Kim Jong-il monopolized power in North Korea, however, some 
evidence shows that his interests did not always coincide with national interests, which 
prioritize the state’s survival. For example, it is hard to explain a large number of purges, 
which were implemented by Kim Jong-il after the death of his father, based only on North 
Korea’s national interests. Also, it is not easy to understand how North Korea’s national 
interests were related to the purpose of investigating and punishing North Korean people 
by military agencies under the banner of military-first politics. Such evidence indicates that 
Kim Jong-il’s decision-making process could have been based on his own political interests 
domestically even though he possessed unchallenged authority in North Korea. In this 
regard, the next chapter investigates the motivations for military-first politics and the 
nuclear weapons program, based on the domestic political perspective. 
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III. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Although the security perspective argues that Kim Jong-il behaved as a unified 
rational actor of North Korea seeking that state’s survival as North Korea’s primary 
national interest under the anarchic international system, there is some evidence that his 
own domestic political interests could have played a more important role in his 
prioritization of interests. For example, after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il purged a 
large number of officials and people and enhanced control over the people’s thoughts and 
movement. These examples demonstrate that his interests did not always coincide with 
North Korea’s national interests and that his priorities were also related to domestic 
political interests. In this regard, his words and writings also reveal some of the truth about 
his interests in solving domestic political issues, and these interests could have played a 
role in the case of developing nuclear weapons. Thus, this chapter demonstrates that North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program significantly resulted from Kim Jong-il’s domestic 
political interests and that these motives, rather than security concerns, could have played 
a somewhat more influential role in that program (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Explanation of Policies from the Domestic Political Perspective 




North Korea does not fit into the RAM in that it is not a unitary actor 
and has internal factors as a complex system 
Survival is the most important interest of a state. Yet, North Korea’s 
national interests do not coincide with those of Kim Jong-il, and, in this 
regard, his words and writings show his own interests  being driven by 




Military-first politics and the development of nuclear weapons were 
results of a relatively coherent utility function, in which Kim Jong-il 
values domestic political interests 
Military-first politics: to build 
a power base, to manage the 
economic crisis, and to 
strengthen control of the 
movement and thinking of the 
North Korean people 
Nuclear weapons 
development:  to utilize the 
programs as direct or indirect 
sources of money and a 
useful pretext for legitimacy 
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A. A LIMITATION OF THE SECURITY PERSPECTIVE 
The explanation of the security perspective has a limitation in that some of the 
North Korean policies implemented by Kim Jong-il cannot be explained well based on 
North Korea’s national interests. As Chapter II discussed, Kim Jong-il was a unitary 
national actor insofar as he monopolized power under the supreme leader system, and he 
could behave on behalf of North Korea’s national interests. In this regard, North Korea fits 
into the RAM, which assumes a unified national actor who has a coherent utility function 
of value-maximizing.166 Accordingly, as his words and writing showed, he could have 
been trying to find a way to ensure North Korea’s survival in the anarchic international 
system by implementing military-first politics and developing nuclear weapons. Yet, the 
security perspective is only partly convincing in that Kim Jong-il’s interests might not have 
consistently coincided with North Korea’s national interests even though he monopolized 
power in North Korea at the time. 
From this point of view, there is some evidence showing that Kim Jong-il’s 
domestic political interests, in contrast to North Korea’s national interests, could have 
played a more important role in his prioritization of interests. After Kim Jong-il took 
power, he purged numerous officials and even ordinary North Korean citizens. To be 
specific, Kim Jong-il formed the so-called intensified investigation division (Shimhuajo) 
and purged about 25,000 people over three years by accusing them of espionage, in an 
effort to remove complaints among North Korean officials and people during the economic 
crisis.167 In 1997, as a result of the intensified investigation, Kim Jong-il executed General 
Lee Bong-won, deputy head of the KPA’s General Political Bureau, and Suh Kwan-hui, 
the agriculture secretary.168 
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Furthermore, Kim Jong-il enhanced the government authority on controlling the 
North Korean people’s movement and thoughts. As food rationing deteriorated after 1992, 
more and more people defected to China in search of food. Accordingly, through the 
inclusion of inspection organizations in the NDC, the core institution of the Kim Jong-il 
era, he strengthened the government’s control over the daily lives of the North Korean 
people. To be specific, he dispatched the military to farms, coal mines, and train stations 
to control people’s movement. In addition to this, the military agencies gained the authority 
to investigate and punish North Korean people and implemented the authority. These 
policies cannot be explained well based on North Korea’s national interests, and this means 
that Kim Jong-il’s interests did not coincide with North Korea’s national interests even 
though he was a unified actor in North Korea. 
B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR THE POLICIES 
The domestic political perspective is persuasive in that it overcomes the limitation 
of the security perspective’s explanation. There were domestic political crises in the 1990s 
caused by the collapse of socialism, the sudden death of Kim Il-sung, and natural disasters. 
Words and writings of Kim Jong-il under the circumstances can be indicative of his 
thinking related to domestic politics: in terms of politics, they show his interests in 
inheriting Kim Il-sung’s guiding principles; in terms of the economy, they reflect his 
interests in the current economic situation and the construction of the socialist economy; 
in terms of society, they reveal his interests in preventing domestic turmoil following the 
collapse of socialism. Based on these concerns, the motivations of the North Korean 
policies can be understood by the domestic political perspective. Through military-first 
politics, Kim Jong-il could have utilized the military to build his own power base; to shift 
the responsibility of economic crisis to external factors and to strengthen the monitoring 
function on economic activities; and to strengthen its control over the North Korean people. 
Similarly, Kim Jong-il could have used the nuclear weapons program as a lucrative source 
of money and a useful pretext for legitimizing his regime, which had given its people only 
severe starvation since it was established (see Table 4). 
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Table 4. Motives for Policies Based on the Domestic Political 
Interests 







To stabilize the political 




economic crisis and 
the construction of a 
socialist economy 
To turn people’s 
attention from the harsh 
reality and to strengthen 
the monitoring function 
of economic activities of 
the residents 
To utilize as direct 
or indirect sources 
of money required 
for legitimizing the 
regime 
Society: preventing 
domestic turmoil after 
the collapse of 
socialism 
To strengthen control 
over the movement and 
thoughts of the North 
Korean people 
To build legitimacy 
by confronting the 
United States 
1. Changes in the Domestic Political Environment 
During the 1990s, there were several domestic political crises in North Korea. First 
of all, the collapse of socialism led to the economic crisis by the reduction of outside 
assistance from communist countries. Also, due to the sudden death of Kim Il-sung, Kim 
Jong-il needed to justify himself as the legitimate successor of the so-called Great Leader 
Kim Il-sung, the first supreme leader of North Korea. Furthermore, two catastrophic floods 
followed by drought caused a huge number of displaced people, destroyed agricultural land, 
and triggered severe famine. These natural disaster consequences eroded the North Korean 
government’s control over the North Korean population’s movement and thoughts. 
a. The Collapse of Socialism 
The collapse of socialism aggravated the North Korean economic crisis by reducing 
outside assistance from communist countries, including the Soviet Union. 169  Despite 
North Korea’s declaration of Juche ideology, which means self-reliance, the country had 
consistently relied upon outside aid throughout its history, and the Soviet Union played the 
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role of the most important benefactor.170 At that time, the Soviet Union supplied North 
Korea with “most of its coal and refined oil and one-third of its steel,” and such trade 
accounted for more than half of the North Korean imports annually.171 With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, however, the decrease in imports from the Soviet Union in 1991 
amounted to 40 percent of the North Korean total annual imports, and the sum of total 
imports in 1992 and 1993 was only 10 percent of the average imports from 1987 to 1990 
(see Figure 1). 172 Given that the foundation of North Korean industry had relied on 
materials and technologies provided by the Soviet Union, the collapse might have had an 
impact proportional to the value of the missing inputs on North Korean industrial 
production.173 Although China emerged as “the primary supplier of imported food” for 
North Korea after the Soviet Union’s collapse, offsetting some of the decreases in trade 
between the Soviet Union and North Korea, China also had reduced its support since 1994 
(see Figure 2).174  
 
Figure 1. Exports of Soviet and the Russian Federation to North 
Korea, 1987–1993175 
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Figure 2. Food Imports from China, 1991–2002176 
b. The Sudden Death of Kim Il-sung 
Another significant domestic political concern in North Korea was that, due to the 
sudden death of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il needed to legitimize his standing as successor to 
the so-called Great Leader Kim Il-sung, the first supreme leader of North Korea. Not only 
had Kim Il-sung monopolized power as a supreme leader from the birth of North Korea to 
the time of his death, but he also had been “the object of a personality cult whose intensity 
and magnitude defy imagination.”177 For example, North Korean publications depicted 
Kim Il-sung’s death on a cosmic level to North Korean people, using language such as “the 
giant star fell from the sky,” “the earth’s rotation stopped,” “the earth’s weight without the 
supreme leader has become lighter,” and “the sun of the sky has been extinguished.”178 
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Outside observers often described Kim Jong-il in stark contrast to his father.179 
They depicted Kim Il-sung as “a guerrilla fighter, the founder of the state, and a 
charismatic, outgoing, outspoken figure until the day he died.” 180  In contrast, they 
described Kim Jong-il as a person who “grew up in privilege from his teenage years, had 
never served a day in the military until he was named supreme commander of the [Korean] 
People’s Army in December 1991, wore his hair in an artsy pompadour, and was notably 
uncomfortable amid the roar of the crowd.”181 These contrasting characteristics could 
explain the reason for the emergence of several factions, most of which were not loyal to 
him when Kim Jong-il became a supreme leader.182 Therefore, it was necessary for Kim 
Jong-il to become the legitimate successor to the so-called Great Leader Kim Il-sung, rather 
than being just his son.183 
In this context, despite the long-standing efforts of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to 
legitimize the succession, several purges after the death of Kim Il-sung indirectly show that 
the legitimacy of the succession was still in doubt. Kim Jong-il had been running a regime-
level campaign to build his image as the legitimate successor since 1973, because he did 
not have characteristics recognized by the North Korean people as the legitimate successor, 
except for his father-to-son relationship with Kim Il-sung.184 This campaign legitimized 
the succession based on the argument that the self-reliance idea pioneered by Kim Il-sung 
needed to be completed by Kim Jong-il, the most faithful person of the younger 
generation.185 However, this legitimization led to resistance from the older elite, who were 
not included in this younger generation,186 and accordingly, it was a key point for Kim 
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Jong-il “to establish his own credentials in order to neutralize broader expressions of 
political dissent.” 187  In this regard, Jo Myong-rok, Kim Il-chol, Ri Yong-moo, Kim 
Young-chun, and Baek Hak-rim were newly appointed as members of the NDC and were 
considered as key figures of the KPA that assisted Kim Jong-il.188 
Nevertheless, Kim Jong-il implemented a large number of purges after the death of 
Kim Il-sung. In 1995, there was a coup attempt by the Sixth Army Corps in Hamkyung 
Province, which was probably assisted by the adjacent Seventh Army Corps. The 
conspiracy was revealed by the Sixth Corps commander, however, and Kim Jong-il 
rewarded him with a promotion and disbanded the Sixth Corps.189 Also, in 1997, General 
Lee Bong-won, deputy head of the KPA’s General Political Bureau, and Suh Kwan-hui, 
agriculture secretary, were reportedly executed as a result of the so-called intensified 
investigation.190  Kim Jong-il had formed the intensified investigation division and, over 
the course of three years, purged 25,000 people by accusing them of espionage, quashing 
complaints among the North Korean people and officials after the economic crisis.191 
Subsequently, to shift the blame, Chae Moon-deok, who led the team, was also purged in 
2000, when Kim Jong-il identified him as a man blinded by ambition who killed his 
comrades.192 Furthermore, in 1998, Kim Yong-ryong, deputy head of the State Security 
Agency, was purged for criticizing the Kim Jong-il regime.193 
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c. Natural Disasters 
The last significant domestic political concern in North Korea was related to natural 
disasters. Two catastrophic floods followed by drought caused a huge number of displaced 
people, destroyed agricultural land, and led to severe famine. 194These developments 
eroded the North Korean government’s control over its people. In terms of food supply, 
successive floods in July and August 1995 exacerbated the suffering of the North Korean 
people, who had already faced starvation caused by the structural problems of agriculture. 
Not only does North Korea have relatively scarce and infertile arable land, it had used 
environmentally unsustainable techniques to maximize output, and this caused a structural 
problem of food production.195 At that time, North Korea announced the total amount of 
damage caused by the floods was $15 billion, including 5.4 million displaced people, 
330,000 hectares of destroyed farmland, and 1.9 million tons of lost grain.196 
Although the international community considered the estimation of the flood 
damage by the North Korean government to be exaggerated,197 the natural disasters were 
serious enough to make North Korean starvation extremely acute. For example, the UN 
estimated that the floods had left 500,000 displaced people.198 Additionally, the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) estimated that a 
half million children and pregnant women were starving due to the floods, and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) predicted that 500,000 people would 
suffer from hunger by that autumn.199 Although there is a large discrepancy between the 
estimations of the North Korean government and those of the international community, 
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natural disasters at the time were serious as studies on North Korean starvation during this 
period assess that at least a hundred thousand to millions had died due to the famine.200 
This problem of food supply made it difficult for the North Korean government to 
maintain control over the people’s movement and thoughts. To be specific, about 400,000 
of North Korean people moved across the northern border to China in search of food due 
to the famine from 1995 to 1997.201 The UN and the United States also estimate that 
between 30,000 and 50,000 North Korean refugees settled in China during this period.202 
This uncontrollable movement of North Korean people across the northern border posed 
an insidiously spreading political problem. At that time, the North Korean government’s 
propaganda for its people had claimed that impoverished life in North Korea was still better 
than that in China, which was damaged by civil war, epidemic, and famine.203 
On the other hand, North Korean people who crossed the border seeking food 
gradually realized that the propaganda was a lie as they saw China’s prosperous reality. A 
North Korean refugee who tried to depict this situation said that “[o]ur first border crossing 
is a grammar school degree [in economics], the second time you visit China is a high school 
diploma, and the third and fourth trips are college and graduate degrees in reality. They 
have been lying to us all these years.”204 In addition, a North Korean policy of encouraging 
these refugees to return from China for registration and voting in the national election 
further undermined popular support.205 In other words, refugees with “graduate degrees,” 
who realized the economic reality of North Korea, had spread the truth to their families 
and neighbors, which significantly damaged the people’s support for the North Korean 
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regime. Various food riots and uprisings during this period indicate the North Korean 
government’s loss of control.206 
2. Perception of the Domestic Political Environment 
As undertaken in the previous chapter, Kim Jong-il’s words and writings can be 
indicative of his thinking related to his domestic political interests. In terms of politics, 
Kim Jong-il’s words and writings in the 1990s show his interest in inheriting Kim Il-sung’s 
guiding principles. After his father’s death, he declared allegience to his father’s guiding 
principles with some slogans, including “Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is with us 
forever” and “let’s be more thoroughly armed with the revolutionary ideas of Great Leader 
Comrade Kim Il-sung.”207 For another example, he declared that “[o]ur party will inherit 
and develop the idea and achievements of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung faithfully 
and accomplish his cause down through generations.”208 Also, he claimed that “[w]e must 
carry out Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions for national reunification and 
fulfill the responsibility and duty our generation has assumed before the country and 
nation.”209  
In terms of the economy, Kim Jong-il’s writings reflect his interest in the current 
economic situation and the construction of the socialist economy. Mindful of the economic 
difficulties that worsened in the 1990s, Kim Jong-il acknowledged that socialism has a 
deficient aspect in material terms compared to capitalism. For example, he described that 
“[t]he socialist countries have incomparable advantages in economic development, but 
they are still relatively backward in the field of material life, compared to the developed 
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capitalist countries.” 210  Despite this, he explained that socialism is still superior to 
capitalism and that the transition to capitalism of socialist countries during the period of 
the collapse of socialism will ultimately fail. For example, he asserted that “[m]odern social 
democracy that opens up the road to a peaceful transition of socialism to capitalism will 
inevitably fail just like the former opportunism of all hues.” 211  In this context, he 
emphasized efforts to construct the socialist economy: 
We must continuously invest great effort into the construction of the 
socialist economy, in order to further strengthen the country’s economic 
power and steadily improve our people’s standard of material life according 
to socialist demands.212 
Finally, in terms of society, his words reveal his interest in preventing domestic 
turmoil following the collapse of socialism. For example, he asserted that “the imperialists 
and reactionaries are claiming that capitalism has triumphed and socialism has come to an 
end … [, and this] is causing ideological confusion among some people who do not 
understand the situation properly.” 213  In this regard, he asserts the importance of 
ideological education, pointing out that the cause of the corruption of socialism in some 
countries is ideological corruption: 
The most serious lesson of the collapse of socialism in several countries is 
that the corruption of socialism begins with ideological corruption, and ... it 
is now imperative for us to awaken the popular masses ideologically and 
rouse them to struggle for socialism.214  
In this context, he emphasized the Juche ideology and nationalism. He asserted that “[i]n 
order to thwart the dominationist machinations of the imperialists and reactionaries … we 
must maintain the Juche character of the revolutionary struggle and construction and 
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sustain their national character.”215 In sum, this evidence shows that Kim Jong-il had one 
set of specified goals, which prioritized his domestic political interests. 
3. Major Motivations for the Policies 
Based on Kim Jong-il’s priorities, motivations for the North Korean policies can be 
understood from the domestic political perspective. Through military-first politics, Kim 
Jong-il utilized the military to build his own power base. With regard to longstanding 
severe poverty and starvation, he tried to turn its people’s attention from the harsh reality 
to outside threats and strengthen the monitoring function of the economic activities of 
North Korea’s residents. In terms of society, he strengthened the control over people’s 
thoughts and movement. Meanwhile, the nuclear weapons program, in the face of the 
economic crisis that had worsened since the collapse of the Soviet Union, became a reliable 
source of money and a useful pretext for legitimizing the Kim Jong-il regime, which had 
given its people only severe starvation since the regime’s establishment ten years earlier. 
a. Military-First Politics 
Kim Jong-il’s priorities related to domestic political interests show that he could 
have used military-first politics as a means of building his own power base, managing the 
economic crisis, and strengthening control over North Koreans’ movement and thoughts. 
(1) Building Kim Jong-il’s Power Base 
In terms of politics, through military-first policies, Kim Jong-il likely utilized the 
military to build his own power base. He had no military experience, unlike Kim Il-sung, 
who was a guerrilla leader against the Japanese military in the 1930s and 1940s. So, to 
overcome this deficiency and to build his credibility as the future supreme leader, during 
the 1980s Kim Il-sung began putting his son, Kim Jong-il, in charge of some military 
positions, where the son could implement institutional control over the military. 216 
Accordingly, the son was “made Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (December 
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1991), promoted to the rank of marshal (August 1992), and appointed chairman of the NDC 
(April 1993).”217 Meanwhile, the military was under the control of the party during the 
Kim Il-sung era when he ruled North Korea as a premier.218 Nevertheless, Kim Jong-il did 
not take over the position of premier even after the death of his father, and he retained the 
position of the chairman of the NDC.219 By doing so, after his father’s death Kim Jong-il 
promoted political stability by governing North Korea according to his dying father’s 
instructions.220 
Nevertheless, after placing those loyal to him in key positions of the NDC, in 1998, 
Kim Jong-il subsequently weakened the party’s power and consolidated his own power 
base by formalizing the NDC’s authority through revisions of the constitution, based on 
the logic of military-first politics.221 This power transition succeeded in killing two birds 
with one stone because the party, which had previously led most of the North Korean 
policies, was losing its attraction among the North Korean people due to the economic 
crisis.222 Although the revised constitution stipulates that the Supreme People’s Assembly 
(SPA) is “the highest organ of State power,” the SPA Presidium President Kim Yong-nam 
declared in 1998 that the NDC’s chairmanship is “the highest post of the state and controls 
all of the political, military, and economic capabilities of the republic.”223  
(2) Managing the Economic Crisis 
At the same time, with regard to longstanding severe poverty and starvation, 
through military-first politics, Kim Jong-il seems to have tried to turn his people’s attention 
from the harsh domestic conditions to outside threats and recover the country’s economy. 
North Korea’s arable land was scarce and less productive, and the country’s use of 
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environmentally unsustainable techniques to maximize output from the given conditions 
resulted in slow-motion famine.224 Especially, in the 1990s, fuel shortages caused by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the largest supplier, stopped agricultural equipment, and the 
natural disasters caused a drastic reduction in agricultural production.225 In this context, 
the North Korean government began campaigns of “eat twice a day” and “skip meals one 
day a month” in the 1990s, and there were various food riots and uprisings.226  
Accordingly, the government needed to turn its people’s attention from such harsh 
conditions to external threats. A book published by the FLPH claimed that the fundamental 
cause of these hardships lay not in food shortages or economic problems but in the 
showdown with imperialist forces, and that the only way to survive was to construct 
military power through military-first politics.227 Military-first politics in this view was a 
charade to make the people believe there was an external threat. 
Also, through military-first politics, Kim Jong-il could monitor business 
management and control residents in the economic arena, where gradually the 
government’s control had loosened after the black market emerged during the economic 
crisis. The suspension of food rationing due to the famine in the 1990s forced the North 
Korean people to operate small kitchen gardens, neglecting their duties on cooperative 
farms.228 In other words, the North Korean people, to find ways to cope with the famine, 
found it necessary to sabotage the system as far as possible.229 Under this circumstance, 
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the 8.3 movement (8.3 Mass Movement of Creation of People’s Consumables),230 which 
emerged in the course of the government’s partial acceptance of marketization in the 1980s, 
degenerated into the spread of illegal transactions of goods other than permitted items and 
the advent of unofficial marketplaces.231 In this context, more and more people began to 
sell illegally produced goods on the black market in an effort to overcome food 
shortages.232 Accordingly, the ideological leadership of Kim Jong-il was damaged as the 
North Korean people were gradually incorporated into this ad-hoc structure of 
capitalism.233 
Amid weakening control over the North Korean people, Kim Jong-il seems to have 
used military-first politics to break through the legitimation crisis by strengthening 
surveillance functions.234 Kim Jong-il’s speech at Kim Il-sung University in 1996 reveals 
his anxiety that marketization might lead to the collapse of his regime.235 In this speech, 
Kim Jong-il expressed his concerns that if people were to start solving the food shortage 
on their own, farmers’ markets would flourish, and that would eventually break the party’s 
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foundation and lead to the collapse of the regime.236 In this context, under the banner of 
military-first politics, the military began to operate a number of trading companies 
managing domestic food distribution, deploy military personnel to construction sites, and 
establish new military farms.237 By doing so, the military could monitor and control the 
management of corporations in the economic areas closely related to people’s lives, 
including factories, collective farms, postal service, and transportation.238 The fact that 
Kim Jong-il subjected the officials who were in charge of monitoring the residents to 
almost total rationing, compared to the general North Korean population, reveals his effort 
to maintain this monitoring system.239 
b. Nuclear Weapons Development 
Kim Jong-il’s priorities related to domestic political interests show that he could 
have used the nuclear weapons program as a reliable source of money and a useful pretext 
for legitimizing his regime. In the face of the economic crisis that had worsened since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the nuclear weapons program became a good source of 
income, both directly and indirectly. On the one hand, Kim Jong-il could obtain badly-
needed hard currency through missile exports to terrorist groups. 240 As North Korea 
advanced its nuclear weapons program, Kim Jong-il could recoup a certain amount of 
revenue by exporting nuclear or missile technologies. Although it is difficult to estimate 
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North Korean missile exports due to that country’s opaque economic activities, one U.S. 
military source estimates that North Korea earned $580 million from the export of missiles 
in 2001, and another study estimates that “missile sales could account for as much as a 
third of North Korea’s export.”241  
Furthermore, the North Korean military sales could also include exportation of 
fissile materials, technologies, and experts for nuclear weapons development. For example, 
North Korea was involved in the construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria, which was 
destroyed by Israel.242 There is evidence strongly indicating that Libya received uranium 
hexafluoride from North Korea in 2004. 243 Based on this history, it is reasonable to 
conclude that North Korea had clear intention to earn hard currency through exportation of 
its nuclear program. The possibility that North Korea might even export completed nuclear 
weapons was a realistic concern. 
On the other hand, Kim Jong-il induced investment and aid from outside by floating 
the possibility of halting North Korea’s nuclear program through negotiations. For 
example, from 1996 to 2002, between the Agreed Framework and suspicion about North 
Korea’s development of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), the United States provided 
more than $1 billion in food aid, concessional fuel oil, and medical supplies to North 
Korea.244 Also, in connection with the first North-South Korea summit, Hyundai, a South 
Korean company, promised payments of approximately $800 million to North Korea by 
2005 as a price for its North Korea tour programs, and the promise was probably upheld.245 
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Additionally, in 2002, South Korea provided the initial cost of $374 million to North Korea 
for the first phase of the construction for the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which aimed at 
lower labor costs for manufactured products by hiring North Korean people. 246 
Furthermore, from 1995 to 2004, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries provided North Korea with development assistance 
amounting to approximately $1,529 million, including $1,151 million from France and 
$142 million from Great Britain.247 
Kim Jong-il could have used the hard currency from these direct and indirect 
sources for legitimizing his regime. In 2001, the North Korea Working Group (NKWG) of 
the United States judged that Kim Jong-il had created a secret fund of between $300 and 
$500 million annually through illicit activities such as missile exports, counterfeiting, and 
drug smuggling.248 The NKWG estimated that North Korea earned $1 billion through 
missile exports to Middle Eastern countries in the 1980s and 1990s.249 According to the 
NKWG, with the secret funds, Kim purchased German-made Mercedes-Benz automobiles, 
Japanese-made home appliances, and French-made cognacs from Hong Kong and Macao 
and presented them to generals and key officials of the KWP.250 The fact that Kim Jong-
il annually purchased $720,000 worth of French cognac, which was $650 per each bottle, 
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supports this analysis.251 As such, while implementing campaigns of “eat twice a day” and 
“skip meals one day a month” for starving North Korean people, Kim Jong-il seems to 
have used the hard currency that he earned directly or indirectly through the nuclear 
weapons program to legitimize his regime by gift politics. 
In terms of politics, the nuclear weapons program seems to have served as a useful 
pretext for legitimizing the Kim Jong-il regime. Although Kim Jong-il seems to have 
legitimized his regime within the leadership class by conducting numerous purges and 
replacing of officials after he took power, it would have been difficult to gain legitimacy 
for the regime from the North Korean people who had been suffering endless starvation. 
At the same time, Kim Jong-il was painfully aware that he was “much more likely to be 
overthrown by … discontented citizens than by a foreign power.”252 Accordingly, Kim 
Jong-il seems to have pursued a strategy to shift the responsibility for the suffering to 
another target.  
Thus, North Korea seems to have preserved the regime’s legitimacy by confronting 
the imperialist United States through its development of nuclear weapons and shifting the 
blame for its economic crisis to the United States, thereby silencing people’s discontent 
and turning their attention elsewhere.253 This basis of legitimization is clear in the New 
                                                 
251 Choi, “Bug-Han Jeon Oe-Gyo-Gwan ‘gim-Jeong-Il 70nyeon-Dae-Bu-Teo Bi-Ja-Geum Jo-Seong’” 
[“Former North Korean Diplomat Says ‘Kim Jong-Il Had Created Secret Funds from the 1970s’”]; Issac 
Stone Fish, “Hennessy Responds to the Loss of Its Best Customer,” Foreign Policy, December 23, 2011, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/23/hennessy-responds-to-the-loss-of-its-best-customer. 
252 Lankov, “Staying Alive,”15. 
253 Habib, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme and the Maintenance of the Songun 
System,” 49. 
57 
Year Address in 2007, which was announced after the first nuclear test by North Korea on 
October 9, 2006254: 
[By possessing nuclear weapons,] our army and people became able to 
break down any enemy’s threat of nuclear war and to defend our socialist 
homeland. … The proud victory of the last year [, the first nuclear test,] 
showed that it has been reasonable to adhere to the military-first politics 
even in the worst adversity for more than a decade.255 
C. THE PREVAILING MOTIVATION 
In relation to these explanations for the major motivations behind the policies, the 
case of sanctioning the BDA highlights how Kim Jong-il’s domestic political drivers 
played a somewhat more important role in the nuclear weapons program than is commonly 
recognized. As discussed in Chapter I, a state’s motivations for developing nuclear 
weapons could be based on more than one reason. Based on this idea, so far, this chapter 
has explained that motivations for the North Korean nuclear weapons program were partly 
based on Kim Jong-il’s domestic political interests. In part, to justify his regime, Kim Jong-
il used the nuclear weapons program as a means of funding required for gift politics aimed 
at North Korean officials and as a useful pretext for shifting the responsibility of the 
economic crisis onto the outside world by confronting the United States. In this regard, the 
case of sanctioning the BDA demonstrates that the nuclear weapons program somewhat 
more depended on Kim Jong-il’s domestic political interests.  
As a response to U.S. sanctions on the BDA, Kim Jong-il abrogated an agreement 
guaranteeing the security of North Korea and tried to re-establish its credit in the 
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international financial system by getting back its frozen funds via a U.S. bank. Through 
the fourth round of the Six Party Talks in September 2005, the parties agreed to provide a 
security guarantee and normalization of diplomatic relations to North Korea. In return, 
North Korea decided to “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and 
return to the NPT.”256 Despite this, the U.S. Department of the Treasury later designated 
the BDA as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern, which caused the 
BDA to freeze $25 million of the North Korean funds.257 Also, as the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury officials stated, “some two dozen financial institutions across the globe have 
voluntarily cut back or terminated their business with North Korea….”258 In response, 
North Korea refused to participate in further talks, conducting missile launches and its first 
underground nuclear test.259 After that, North Korea demanded the return of its frozen 
funds via a U.S. bank as the requirement to resume the Six Party Talks.260  
North Korea’s demand to have the frozen funds returned through a U.S. bank shows 
that, in this case, Kim Jong-il’s domestic political interests were somewhat stronger drivers 
for the nuclear weapons program than his security concerns, which are in the national 
interest. If the prevailing motivation for Kim Jong-il’s nuclear weapons program was to 
secure nuclear deterrence capability against foreign nuclear threats, it would have been 
better for him to maintain the ongoing agreement, which provided a security guarantee and 
removed the necessity of a secure nuclear deterrence capability.  
Some suggest that Kim Jong-il lost trust in the United States as a partner for 
negotiation or that other motivations related to the BDA became somewhat more influential 
than the U.S. security guarantee. On the other hand, North Korea’s demand to get back its 
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frozen funds via a U.S. bank appears to put more importance on recovering its credibility 
rather than on re-establishing trust. In other words, Kim Jong-il seems to have tried to 
regain credibility in the international financial system by getting back those frozen funds 
via a U.S. bank.261 By doing so, to fund his gift politics,262 Kim Jong-il could secure a 
means for receiving money earned from clandestine activities, such as ballistic missile 
exports to the Middle East, which generated as much as $580 million in a year.263 
The case demonstrates that, with regard to the North Korean nuclear weapons 
program, Kim Jong-il valued his domestic political interests more than the national interest, 
indicating that domestic politics was a somewhat more important driver for nuclear 
weapons development. The security perspective assumes that Kim Jong-il was a unitary 
actor and could act on behalf of the national interest, given that he monopolized power. In 
fact, Kim Jong-il could have achieved the national interest to alleviate external nuclear 
threats by maintaining the existing agreement, which would guarantee the security of North 
Korea. By contrast, the domestic political perspective assumes that, although Kim Jong-il 
monopolized power, North Korea was a complex system with many compelling internal 
factors, and, in this regard, his interests might not have matched the national interests. From 
this point of view, Kim Jong-il primarily sought to secure funds required for gift politics, 
a means for justifying his regime, by the lifting of sanctions on the BDA. In this context, 
Kim Jong-il’s choice to abrogate the existing agreement shows that he was more strongly 
influenced by his domestic political interests. Thus, with regard to motivations for the 
North Korean nuclear weapons development, the case demonstrates that domestic politics 
were somewhat more influential than security concerns at the time. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described a limitation of the explanation for the motivations 
behind North Korea’s policies from the security perspective and demonstrated that Kim 
Jong-il’s domestic political interests were a prevailing motivation for military-first politics 
and North Korean nuclear weapons development. The security perspective has a limitation 
in that some policies during the Kim Jong-il era cannot be explained well based on North 
Korea’s national interest. Even though Kim Jong-il monopolized power in North Korea, 
his interests often did not coincide with North Korea’s national interests. In other words, 
North Korea does not fit into the RAM in that it does not represent a unitary actor and, as 
a complex system, has influential internal factors. In this regard, during the 1990s, there 
were domestic political forces at work—the collapse of socialism, the sudden death of Kim 
Il-sung, and natural disasters—and Kim Jong-il’s words and writings are indicative of his 
domestic political interests related to those crises.  
Therefore, based on this idea, the domestic political perspective provides an 
essential element to explain Kim Jong-il’s motives for pursuing military-first politics and 
the nuclear weapons program. Kim Jong-il sought to build a power base, manage the 
economic crisis, and strengthen control over the movement and thoughts of the North 
Korean people by military-first politics. Also, Kim Jong-il used the nuclear weapons 
program as a reliable source of income and a useful pretext for legitimizing his regime. 
Especially, North Korea’s response to the U.S. sanction on the BDA exposes how Kim 




This thesis examined the motivations behind North Korea’s major policies during 
the Kim Jong-il era—military-first politics and the development nuclear weapons— from 
the Agreed Framework in 1994 to the end of the Six Party Talks in 2009. The thesis 
examined these motivations from the security and domestic political perspectives and, 
especially, considered how environmental changes at home and abroad affected those 
motivations. The thesis argues that domestic politics ultimately became the prevailing 
motivation for the North Korean nuclear weapons program due to changes in the political, 
economic, and social environment at home and abroad during the period.  
To test and support the argument, Chapter II adopted the security perspective, 
which assumed that Kim Jong-il could act on behalf of North Korea’s national interests as 
the unitary actor who monopolized power under the supreme leader system. This chapter 
showed there is indeed evidence that he developed nuclear weapons mainly to address the 
national interest of survival in the face of foreign threats, but there is also evidence 
inconsistent with that explanation.  
Subsequently, Chapter III adopted the domestic political perspective, using it to 
explain how Kim Jong-il largely tried to justify his regime and satisfy other powerful 
interests through the nuclear weapons program. This chapter showed how the domestic 
political perspectives fill in the limitations identified in explanations for North Korean 
policies from the security perspective, explaining that some of Kim Jong-il’s policies were 
unrelated or even contradictory to North Korea’s national interests because those policies 
were mainly related to his domestic political incentives. 
The thesis concludes with a summary of the findings, implications, and limitations 
of the research, and offers suggestions for future research. This chapter explains key 
findings and implications inferred from the research. It then discusses limitations of the 
research and suggests directions for future researches to overcome these limitations. 
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A. FINDINGS 
Through the process of testing the hypothesis, the thesis identifies two important 
findings on North Korea’s motivations for developing nuclear weapons. 
1. The Prevailing Motivation 
From the Agreed Framework in 1994 to the end of Six-Party Talks in 2009, 
political, economic, and social changes impacting North Korea at home and abroad shaped 
Kim Jong-il’s domestic political motivations for developing nuclear weapons and played a 
somewhat more important role than North Korea’s security concerns. During the period 
studied, North Korea suffered domestic political crises due to those changes, including the 
legitimation crisis of socialism and the loss of economic support after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the leadership crisis due to the sudden death of Kim Il-sung, and the famine 
caused by consecutive natural disasters. These crises raised questions about the legitimacy 
of socialism and the Kim Jong-il regime, and, as a response, he utilized the nuclear weapons 
program to justify the regime to some extent. 
To be specific, a large portion of the hard currency earned from exports of nuclear 
and missile technologies obtained in the course of developing nuclear weapons were used 
as funds for Kim Jong-il’s gift politics to ensure the legitimacy of the regime among 
officials. Kim Jong-il offered luxury vehicles and a generous supply of expensive cognac 
to officials to maintain their loyalty to the regime, even while directing campaigns at the 
North Korean people to promote their willingness to forego meals as a way to overcome 
the famine. Also, he tried to placate the people’s discontent with the regime by shifting the 
responsibility for their hardships onto outside threats, which drove confronting the United 
States with the nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the case of the U.S sanction on the 
BDA in 2005 demonstrates that the nuclear weapons program was largely influenced by 
Kim Jong-il’s domestic political interests at the time. The case shows that the development 
of nuclear weapons at least sometimes mainly focused on securing funds needed to justify 
the regime through gift politics rather than the ensuring the security of North Korea. 
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2. “Multicausality” of Motivations 
As Sagan and several other scholars argue, Kim Jong-il’s security concerns and 
domestic political motivations worked simultaneously (multicausality) in determining the 
development of nuclear weapons. Although Kim Jong-il’s domestic political interests were 
the prevailing motivations for the nuclear weapons program at the time, his security 
concerns also played a major role in his decision to develop nuclear weapons. At the time, 
North Korea faced huge changes in the security environment, including the reduction of 
military aid after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the successful implementation of South 
Korea’s northern politics to normalize its relationship with socialist countries and the 
growing capabilities of its conventional forces, and the continuation of U.S. hardline policy 
toward North Korea. Under these changes in the security environment, North Korea 
developed the nuclear weapons program in part to seek survival in the self-help 
international system. In response to growing security threats from the United States and 
South Korea, North Korea sought to protect its sovereignty and national security by 
securing a nuclear deterrence capability by acquiring and developing nuclear weapons, 
which have enormous destructive power. 
Thus, Sagan’s concept of multicausality of nuclear weapons development is a 
helpful construct to explain the motivations behind North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program from 1994 to 2009. This thesis advances understanding of North Korean behavior 
by demonstrating how domestic political factors were a prevailing motivation throughout 
this period. At the same time, the analysis of this thesis demonstrates that appreciating the 
multiple causes of nuclear weapons development can be necessary for a complete 
explanation.     
B. IMPLICATION 
The findings of this thesis have an important implication for policies by the 
international community to restrain nuclear weapons proliferation. Specifically, with 
regard to those findings, in order to achieve desired outcomes from the international 
community’s efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is important to 
consider the “multicausality” of motivations.  
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During the Agreed Framework, the international community’s efforts to 
denuclearize North Korea mainly focused on providing infrastructure for energy 
production based on the assumption that North Korea attempts to overcome its energy 
shortage by the nuclear program. Subsequently, during the Six Party Talks, the 
international community focused its efforts on guaranteeing the security of North Korea 
based on the assumption that North Korea pursues a nuclear deterrence capability to protect 
its sovereignty and national security. As this thesis has demonstrated, however, domestic 
political factors were also a prevailing and sometimes decisive influence over North 
Korea’s behavior. The international community’s efforts to denuclearize North Korea in 
the 1994-2009 period failed in part because they were based on assumptions about North 
Korea’s motivations that were too simple, overlooking the prevailing role of domestic 
political factors, especially Kim Jong-il’s need to preserve the legitimacy of his rule. 
Because nuclear weapons development is often based on several major motivations 
working at the same time, the international community needs to consider what motivations 
a proliferation state has at a given point in time in order to stop nuclear proliferation. By 
doing so, those efforts could reduce a state’s overall incentive to develop nuclear weapons, 
and thus make nuclear weapons unnecessary. 
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis has limitations in terms of the validity of the assumed rationality of Kim 
Jong-il and the credibility of data related to North Korea.  
In the process of explaining both perspectives, the thesis assumed Kim Jong-il’s 
behavior was rational. To be specific, the thesis assumed that Kim Jong-il, as the unitary 
actor, would make decisions rationally with an eye to North Korea’s national interests, and, 
as an actor in the complex system, would make decisions rationally based on his domestic 
political drivers. These assumptions commonly explain that Kim Jong-il would behave 
rationally to achieve his objectives, thereby precluding consideration of irrationality.  
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In this regard, Robert Jervis’s study discussing the cognitive limitations of decision 
makers can raise a question about the validity of this assumption.264 Studies of irrational 
decision making suggest that excluding the possibility of irrationality of decision makers 
may sometimes lead to significant errors. For example, Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman’s framing effect demonstrates that the result of decision making depends on 
how issues are framed.265  
Also, this thesis, like other studies on North Korea, has a limitation in terms of the 
credibility of the data on which its analysis is based. So far, the thesis cited data from 
various research institutes to explain the security perspective and the domestic politics 
perspective. These materials have problems in terms of credibility in that they are based on 
the reasoning or speculation of scholars or testimonies from North Korean defectors rather 
than official data or disclosed information by the North Korean government.  
In particular, many major scholars such as Bermudez, Kwon, Oh, and Hassig, and 
the testimony of North Korean defectors, hold that Kim Jong-il monopolized power and 
thereby had exclusive decision-making authority under the supreme leader system.266 
Nevertheless, some major scholars, such as McEachern, rely on the analysis of North 
Korean literature to argue that North Korea’s decision making depends on bureaucratic 
rivalry. 267  Information on this aspect of North Korean internal governmental power 
balances has a limitation in credibility due to the regime’s opacity, and there are issues of 
representativeness and reliability in that the testimony of North Korean defectors may be 
fragmentary and involve their political bias.268 In Chapter III, the account of the role of 
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“gift politics” demonstrates some of the internal power relationships in North Korea. But, 
due to the limitations of this kind of evidence, the thesis does not evaluate how these 
relationships function or how much they might limit Kim Jong-il’s monopolized power. 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
To compensate for the discussed limitations of the thesis, future research 
considering North Korea’s motives for developing nuclear weapons needs to take into 
account the possible irrationality of decision makers. From the security perspective, for 
example, based on Jervis’s theory of a decision maker’s cognitive limitations, one can 
examine hostile images of the United States for Kim Jong-il and how the resulting security 
concerns affected his decision to develop nuclear weapons. Based on Tversky and 
Kahneman’s framing effects, one might investigate how the domestic political 
consequences of Kim Jong-il’s development of nuclear weapons were negatively or 
positively defined, thereby influencing his decision making. 
Furthermore, from the domestic political perspective, future research can make use 
of any improvements in the evidence related to how the North Korean regime works 
internally. A better understanding of the domestic relationships of power would enable a 
more precise evaluation of the balance between national security and domestic political 
factors in shaping North Korea’s decisions on the further development and delivery of 
nuclear weapons.  
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